Intervention in Libya: third time lucky?

It’s amazing how fast things can happen. This time last week we were still arguing about the merits of a no-fly zone and the likelihood of it being established in the first place — late Saturday night the first bombs dropped. In less than a week time the proposal for a no-fly zone was not only voted on and passed, but the preperations for enforcing it were made and finished to such an extent that the French could actually start bombing within a day of it passing and what’s more, immediately exceeded their mandate by bombing tanks attacking Benghazi. After all, resolution 1973 was supposedly all about the no-fly zone wasn’t it, making sure Khadaffi couldn’t use his airforce to bomb civilians, so what are the Armée de l’Air and RAF doing bombing tanks?

Well, it turned out that while the idea of a no-fly zone emerged quickly in media debate once the civil war in Libya started, the assumption that this and nothing more was what the UN had been asked to authorise was wrong. Because while the resolution does establish a no-fly zone, does sharpen the arms embargo and asset freezes already put in place in an earlier resolution, it also does this this:

Authorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory, and requests the Member States concerned to inform the Secretary-General immediately of the measures they take pursuant to the authorization conferred by this paragraph which shall be immediately reported to the Security Council;

(Paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 forbids the supply of arms to Libya — with certain exceptions — and seems to be negated here. Does this mean arms supplies for the Libyan rebels?)

In other words, there’s a legal justification to take every sort of action against Libyan forces short of wholescale invasion, a far wider mandate than we were told was asked for. I’m not sure whether this was by design or accident, but I think it’s sensible to assume the former, especially since France was so quick to start the actual bombing, without even pretending to stick to no-fly zone enforcement. What worries me most is the sense that this was the only thing that was planned and tha, like Afghanistan, like Iraq, nobody has any idea what comes between 1) Bomb the shit out of our enemies and 3) Freedom and Democracy for everybody, that we’re stuck with yet another underpants-gnomian war.

Questions I haven’t seen answered yet are 1) who are the rebels and why should we support them other than whisky democracy sexy, 2) what is the end result we’re fighting for, what is the minimal acceptable outcome of this intervention, 3) how are we going to reach that state other than by bombing the shit out of the country, 4) what if Khadaffi can’t be defeated through aerial power, what then?

I can see two scenarios in which this campaign can end, other than the glorious triumph of western democracy: Iraq 1991 and Iraq 2003. Either we end up with a Libya with Khadaffi in power in the central part of the country and the rebels in control in the east or we might end up with “having to invade” because the air campaign failed. Either way Libya’s screwed and the failure of the opposition to, unlike in Tunesia and Egypt, get rid of Khadaffi on their own does not make me optimistic. Mercenaries or no mercenaries, Khadaffi must still have some sizeable support amongst the population to have survived a wave of protest that did in Ben Ali and Mubarak. Which means that there will be at least part of the population unhappy with any outcome: either the Khadaffi loyalists if he is overthrown, or the rebels if he isn’t. The same was of course true in Egypt and Tunesia, but there the base of support for Mubarak and Ben Ali seemed to be much smaller…

So no, I don’t think third time’s the charm for western intervention in a Middle Eastern/Muslim country.

That LSE – Khadaffi scandal

Justin puts it in perspective:

So, we’re all jolly cross at the London School of Economics for taking Gaddafi’s cash. We’re less cross (if at all) at the arms trade for doing the same. I haven’t heard any calls for the head of BAE Systems to resign, for instance. After all, BAE Systems were only flogging anti-tank missiles while the LSE were flogging management training, the bastards.

Which is fair enough, but when this sentiment mutates into something like what Charli Carpenter argues:

The graduation of a plagiarist raises my eyebrows (as you might guess) but as recent discussions have suggested going easy on academic dishonesty is hardly a problem limited to LSE. And simply the choice to make good-faith engagements with authoritarian elites or their children should not be treated, in hind-sight, as evidence of collusion.

Then methinks you’re protesting too much. If getting easy PH.Ds for the children of dictators as part of a general buttering up for the purpose of getting lots and lots of arms and other sales for British industry is not collusion, what is? Why should the LSE “make good-faith engagements with authoritarian elites”9or their children) in the first place? What does that even mean?

From where I’m sitting it’s clear the LSE let itself be used in a general campaign to butter up Khadaffi so that he would buy loads and loads of weapons and other equipment from British industry while also allowing Khadaffi to improve his own p.r. image through that research fund his son set up at the LSE. Now it’s reaping the whirlwind of that decision to get in bed with a dictator. That this is s.o.p. for most or even all UK elite universities does not make it right. It’s hard to feel sorry for them and it’s no use to bray about “politics of the mob” when you’re so clearly in the wrong, even if others were just as wrong or more so. That just means there are others that need to make amends too. No gangster’s pal ever won his trial by pointing out others were friends with Capone as well.

More generally, this attitude that it’s alright to do business with dictators as long as they’re our dictators is why the Middle East has never managed to become free: because our governments, businesses and universities always priviledged money over morality. It no longer suffices to argue that we should be realistic and not blame people for getting into bed with dicators because there was no alternative: the people of Egypt, Libya and Tunesia have shown us otherwise.

Libya says: No Foreign Intervention

no foreign intervention

Libya says: no foreign intervention. Jamie spells it out:

I think it’s a reasonable supposition that the banner represents the broad opinion of the insurgents. It’s natural to want to finish your own revolution. Whether it represents the opinions of the civilians stuck in the middle is another matter. But that in itself points up that if you do decide to – say – return the Sixth Fleet’s Marine Expeditionary Force to the shores of Tripoli, then you’re going to have a lot of angry revolutionaries to deal with as well as Gaddafi’s mob. And if you want to influence the eventual political outcome of a revolution, the first people you need on your side are the ones who took up arms.

The Rodent is even more blunt in his assessment of the chances of US/UK military intervention succeeding:

Let’s do the maths once more here, for clarity. In the past decade, Britain and/or the Americans have either bombed, invaded and/or occupied Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia; our wacky allies have bombed Lebanon, Syria and Gaza, and the United States also maintains military bases in Bahrain, Israel, Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

You can assess that using whatever justifications and euphemisms you like, but any major campaign against Libya is going to be a hard, hard sell to the UN as disinterested humanitariansm, even if it’s exactly that. Assuming we’re bothering with the formalities this time, that is.

Still, the British government, eh? All the memory capacity of a geriatric goldfish in a body filled with adventuresome spirit and a few hundred bloody bulletholes. What a plucky bunch we are.

But, as Louis Proyect reports, that doesn’t stop some on the left from automatically taking a pro-khadaffi, or as they call it, a anti-anti-khadeffi stance just because the US and UK are making some noise about maybe doing something about Khadaffi. It’s a blindingly stupid attitude, both to not support a popular uprising because you think the US might profit from it and to think that this is actually could be an American engineered revolution. Anybody with half a brain can see that the US and EU were both taken completely by surprise by the developments in the Middle East, had no idea about how to respond to the uprisings and are still trying to regain control somehow. To think any of this was engineered by anybody is so clueless it edges into Glenn Beck territory.

All the talk about no-fly zones and intervention, though it should resisted of course, is just an attempt to spin events in such a way to put the western powers back in the driving seat, or at least give the impression they are in control again and on the side of angels. Reality is otherwise: it’s the people of Libya, Egypt, Tunesia, Yemen, Oman, Bahrein and so on who are, for the first time in decades, in the lead.

It’s always about money: if it looks like it isn’t, look closer

Gin and Tacos highlights one of the lesser known parts of the Wisconsin emergency budget repair bill, one that would let the governor sell off public infrastructure at fire sale prices:

16.896 Sale or contractual operation of state-owned heating, cooling, and power plants. (1) Notwithstanding ss. 13.48 (14) (am) and 16.705 (1), the department may sell any state-owned heating, cooling, and power plant or may contract with a private entity for the operation of any such plant, with or without solicitation of bids, for any amount that the department determines to be in the best interest of the state. Notwithstanding ss. 196.49 and 196.80, no approval or certification of the public service commission is necessary for a public utility to purchase, or contract for the operation of, such a plant, and any such purchase is considered to be in the public interest and to comply with the criteria for certification of a project under s. 196.49 (3) (b).

Noted in comments, a nice added bonus:

“(c) If the department sells or contracts for the operation of any state−owned
heating, cooling, and power plant under sub. (1), the secretary may identify any full−time equivalent positions authorized for the state agency that has operating authority for the plant, the duties of which primarily relate to the management or operation of the plant, and may decrease the authorized full−time equivalent positions for that state agency by the number of positions so identified effective on the date that the state agency no longer has operating authority for the plant.”

Meanwhile on the other side of the Atlantic, David Cameron is helping Middle East states on the road to democracy by selling them weapons:

So, following Cameron’s logic, it’s cool to flog things that kill people to countries as long as they’re on an ‘open and participatory’ trajectory. If people get killed or maimed on the journey? Let’s not think about that. That British weapons seem to be being used to prevent states becoming ‘open and participatory’ rather than being used to usher in democracy and universal values has passed the Prime Minister by.

Cameron can point to testimonies from satisfied customers like Khadaffi, who is using British bullets and tear gas to put down his people’s longing for democracy. Money trumps morals and has always done.